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THE COSMIC CHARACTER

IN two earlier articles in this JOURNAL[1] the writer worked to grub out the roots of the pragmatic tree of knowledge. The tap-root he found to be a bare function, an universal activity, in its *primal* nature subpersonal and subconscious. In this paper I presume to deal with the apparent disparity between this God, as blind, subvegetable, metaphysical first cause, and the cosmic *character*, the God alive, upon which religious experience seems to depend.

I

First of all we must disabuse our minds of the notion that the cosmic character is *substantial*. The function in which life, whether human or cosmic, has its primal cause is practically universal and eternal; but only *practically*. The function is so long as life is; conscious activity (*sum cogitans*) is indubitable so long as the living doubt continues, but no longer. It is theoretically conceivable that all life, cosmic as well as human, should cease to be. In this catastrophic event the allegedly everlasting water-springs would have run dry, the tap-root of being would wither and dry up into nothing, the world-soul would flicker out in black death.

But there is in all this no occasion for pausing. Tested pragmatically, death and nothing are unthinkable concepts. Reflection upon them could not further, but only retard life. Their sole reality consists in their devilish power to defeat at every point the lust of rationalism, the senseless passion for *absolute* certainty. Meanwhile I find no thinkable connection between this absolute certainty and that *practical* certainty upon which active life depends.

The cosmic function is indeed *conceivably* perishable. But its decadence into death and nothing is *practically* unthinkable. Just because the cosmic life would in such an event flicker out into nothing, no one could possibly prepare his person for such a catastrophic end. The very last assumption with which our practical reason can get on is that of a functional activity, which, as active, is practically absolute and imperishable; and this no matter what disease, human

[1] Vol. IV., pp. 176–183, and Vol. VI., pp. 57–64.

or cometary, may assault its universal life. Let one be purely humanitarian in his humanism after the manner of the positivists. Even so, he must assume that energy in one form or another of human activity is unassailable. This is the live nub of the schoolman's insistence upon an eternal as *existent*. There simply *must* be an ἄπειρον, he thinks—a That in its root impractical, but in its potentialities inexhaustible and practically absolute.[2]

There has got to be an universal energy on which the phenomenal life of God and of men may draw endlessly. Of course men and God may not have this limitless credit in the great vault beyond. There is a certain speculative risk in all life, for that is the condition of life. Our lives, human and cosmic, depend upon taking the cash here and now and letting the credit go on so long as it will. It could only be after God and we were eternally dead and nothing, that the default of universal energy could reduce us to destitution and starvation; *i. e.*, never so long as we know ourselves.

In action the universal energy does function radically. It sloughs off dead parts from the cosmic organism and renews its withered members. The cosmic environment here and now is all on the side of health and perpetuity for those who are fit. And this is the first datum of the cosmic character: its inherent ability to preserve itself alive, its practical assumption that the energy within and without is everlastingly real and subject to all the drafts which can possibly be made upon it in the interest of life.

II

The implication of this first datum is that the cosmic character is an *achievement*. The universal energy must be drawn *upon*. In itself it is in the last degree impersonal, impractical, indifferent. The etymologists confirm this in their account of the verb of being. "To be" in its root-meaning is "to stand forth." The world-energy, I dare say, genuinely *is* only when it stands forth. The root-meaning of life is exclamatory, assertive, the will-to-power. I am: that I am.

Too often cosmic life has been conceived as an energy which must *needs* function in the form of a phenomenal, universal life: its standing forth is a necessary function of its eternal being. The Eternal thus unconsciously and without effort creates and maintains the best possible world: the world-soul does not actively draw upon, but is poured in upon, *by* the universal energy. But this postulate of willy-nilly creative energy goes against the grain of human experience. The fact is that the pouring-in process implies a certain suction on

[2] Poincaré says some clever things of this "something" as it stands in theoretical physics. See his "Science and Hypothesis," *e. g.*, p. 166.

the part of the living organism. The receiving of power from on high or from within implies a will-to-power. The first-class pessimists are wanting in this will; for them there is agony in the growing-pains of life's processes. They accordingly refuse to suckle themselves at the breast of being. They would sink back into the tireless, senseless That they set out from. It is not inherently impossible that one should in the end utterly dam the inlets of the universal energy.

We must remark in this a second datum of the cosmic character. The will-to-power implies a will-to-impotence. This ingrained feature of the human organism must be transcribed into the cosmic life as well. There is an energy circumpressing both within and without. Upon this the cosmic life draws at all times and places of its eventual life. The drawing-in process is not necessary, but optional. Merely to be, to stand forth, is in itself an unconscious symptom of health and character. For the universal life, like the human in its morbid moods, may genuinely prefer dissolution to further organization, death to life. The world-organism is thus an achievement. The tirelessness, persistency, and continuity of its being are symptomatic of a certain sanity, a congenital, temperamental healthy-mindedness in the living soul of things.

There are cases, individual and racial, of apparently incurable insanity: the inlets of the universal life with its unconscious sanity seem hopelessly dammed up. Such evil is radical. Its cure, I imagine, can only be effected, if by any means, by a painful, conscious operation within the universal life itself. Certainly in its case the unconscious remedial agency of the cosmic life has miserably failed. But in any event the existence here and there of diseased parts in the world-organism does not argue that the whole is incompetent or likely to degenerate into the amorphous energy—the cosmic infancy it set out from. The evidence weighs heavily on the side of the general *sanity* of the cosmic life.

A third datum of the cosmic character, therefore, is its animal efficiency and unconscious sanity. It achieves being, it draws upon the universal energy by a natural instinct-to-be.

III

In these prime data, however, the cosmic character is subconscious and subpersonal. So far, the cosmic life is strictly animal: it grows instinctively in the virgin womb of being. The human life is suckled, fortified and sanified within this cosmic animal.[3]

[3] One feels secure and willing to function naturally within cosmos's great organism. But I wonder if our cosmic emotion at this level is not really comparable with the gratitude we might feel toward a great animal that has instinctively saved our own skin and bones from the grave?

This, too, is religion of a certain type and its proper emotions are in a profound degree theophanic. Meanwhile it is arch-pessimism—a religion based upon the experience of personal life as a disease of consciousness to be remedied by anesthesis and analgesis, a return to the subconscious organism of which personal feeling-will is but an inflamed member. Cosmic character, so the argument goes, is only weakened and diseased by these germs of personality.

The writer agrees that a *person* is an inflammation of cosmic being. But this disease of personality is a condition in which alone such terms as "purpose," "value," "worth," "morality," gain genuine meaning. Religious pessimism has always aimed at so-called *unconscious* purpose, *instinctive* worth, *animal* morality. But really these are all contradictions in terms. They would reduce ends to unconscious, instinctive, animal functions, whereas the quintessential meaning of an end requires that it be consciously felt, aimed at, controlled; in a word, that it prepossess and be consciously acknowledged by some person. I grant that this condition is hard. Each fulfillment wherein a conscious purpose becomes a part of the organism's unconscious character is but the progenitor of another newly-felt purpose; and so on endlessly. But this constitutes *conscious* as distinguished from *unconscious* character. In personality there is an indispensable, endless challenge to unfulfilled being, a "standing forth" which, on the one hand, will not permit the human life to sink back into the unconscious bliss of animal activity it has risen above, and which, on the other hand, can never raise that human life to a haven of supraconscious rest. Fichte found this inner *anstoss* a challenge for all time. Carlyle leapt under it as under a cosmic lash. Poor Nietzsche lost his sanity under the pressure of its ceaseless will-to-power.

At all events, the cosmic life has in *us* taken on a conspicuous personal character. In us its present ends are genuinely felt. In us its ends are unthinkable, endless, as the pessimists are everlastingly reminding us; but they are none-the-less conscious imperatives. We may risk disease, lose the sanity of our pure reason in gaining the sanity of our practical, but if we turn back we are as salt which has lost its savor: we lose the very flavor and essence of character. In us, then, the blind character of the cosmic impulses has become endlessly conscious. Henceforth we must *aim* at being, we must control our ends even to the point where the abysmal possibilities of being blind us with a new kind of blindness; the blindness of one whose pupils strain to take in the invisible.

"But this is positivism, pure and simple," some one will say. "This is human character, very good while it lasts! but it makes out no such case for the *universal* life. It means merely that a cer-

tain animal has evolved into conscious self-possession. Man, so far, *sports* above his cosmic progenitor. Like positivism, your cosmic humanism is really an *ungodding* (*Entgöttung*) of the universal life, a surreptitious deification of human being. Is God, then, merely a 'crowd-consciousness'?"

To all this cosmic humanism must reply imperturbably: God, if not *merely* human, is at any rate *essentially* just that. Our humanism has practically all its active interests in common with scientific positivism.[4] In its description of the universal life there is no taint of magic religion nor of overleapng metaphysics. The world-ground as the incomparably fecund matrix of the present cosmos is in our view identical with the ether-strains of experimental physics. Cosmos is a system of countless straining relations, a complex of *Energie-strömen*. Psychophysically the cosmic character appears, so far, as an organism of vital activities risen to the level of animal subconsciousness. In us this cosmic animal has varied to the high level of personal consciousness.

But then, the "eternal" of rationalism is an unnecessary hypothesis, if only *human* character be allowed *cosmic* application and sweep. If conscious aiming is now and practically universal in the cosmic life, to say that it has been eternally so adds nothing significant to the present facts and life of the world-soul. The fact is that the hypothesis of an eternal, infinite character unconsciously seeks to remedy the one glaring defect in positivism; namely, its inveterate thinking of man *apart* from cosmos. But the human organism is continuous with the unthinkably limpid stuff of which the universal life itself is a function. In a most important and literal sense the character of any part of the world-life is in its degree the character of the whole. The universal energy which all life draws upon is practically a perfect, limpid fluid. If I tap my desk here with my pen the world-ground is moved gelatinously throughout its whole being. Now, I permit in my person impulses of conscious purpose; these aims are like my pen-taps of a moment ago; whenever they hit the truth in the bull's-eye, they ring their reality into the whole cosmic life; and this by physical necessity, if you please. The cosmic life in us and through us has become in all its physical energies a personal animal. Should it turn back from the endless Person it now aims to become, should it seek to reduce or prevent the inflammation which in us brings it to conscious possession of all its own latent energies, it would surely degenerate into the blind, witless being it once was.

An infinite appetite for personal being is thus a third datum of the cosmic character.

[4] I mean "scientific" as distinguished from the more passionate but shallower ethical positivism.

IV

Once we entertain the notion that the cosmic life is moved through and through by the birth of men within its being there remains only the task of ascribing to the cosmic character the ineradicable forms and passions of the human organism. For the religion of humanism will turn out to be in the highest degree anthropomorphic and anthropopathic in its experience of the divine life.

As to the anthropomorphic character of the cosmic life. The cosmic physique obviously is free from the parts and organs we commonly remark in the frames of animals; it has no *systems,* circulatory, skeletal, urinogenital, and the like. It has not the blue eyes and fair hair of its Thracian idolator, nor the flat nose of the Ethiopian. It is as it were "all eye," "all ear," and "all thought." If it be physical at all, it would seem to have the quality of sensuous experience without the visible end-organs thereof.

Is, then, the cosmic life completely amorphous? This we can hardly say; for there is in fact a cosmic physique—planets, stars, earths, comets, all more or less harmoniously adjusted by this time into a systematic whole. Our thought of the cosmic life may thus in one point be psycho*physical,* and anthropo*morphic.* It is of course a figure to speak of the universal life as "all eye" and "all ear." Regarding its *gross* anatomy, one would be nearer the literal truth in thinking of the cosmic physique as *all brain.* The stellar universe, once more in its *gross* anatomy, is not unlike the cellular structure of a human cerebrum.[5] Of all our animal psychophysical functions it is the cerebral which the cosmic life most nearly duplicates.

It would seem that we can dispense with every other form of physique save the nervous. Let idealism operate to remove that, and the remaining reality is in the last degree unreal and impractical. Thus the cosmic life, like the human, may be conceived as indefinitely changing the form of its neural physique, constantly refining its centers and perhaps generating new (astral) nervous systems *ad libitum.* But the neural *gist* must persist if the life, human or cosmic, is to be real and practical in its impulses and ideas.

Cosmic humanism is thus anthropomorphic in its religious intention. In its essential terms it gratifies men's ingrained passion for human form in the divine life; *i. e.,* by establishing in the place of the overturned God of hands and feet a real community of cerebral experience between man and the universal life. The physique of the cosmic life touches the physique of man in his most sensitive organ,

[5] If a cerebrum were magnified to be proportionate with the stellar universe, I imagine the individual neurons would present a spectacle not unlike that of the stars and planets of the elliptoid universe.

the brain. Physical functioning of the highest order (ideal coordinations, associations, intracortical strains, and the like) is the same in both. The fourth datum of the cosmic life is thus brain-character.

If now we determine what this cerebral function is when void of all the more external organic sensations and functions of the human frame, we shall have some sense of the anthropopathic character of the cosmic life.

V

The elements left in our conscious processes after the elision of all sensory and organic qualities we are permitted to transcribe into the psychophysical life of the world-soul. We exclude at once all the base constituents of our human experience, all organic and sensory processes. The cosmic brain exposes no lobes; nor is it attached sympathetically to the "systems" which enliven our human frames. What, then, *is* this pure, cerebral experience?

1. There is in our human system a certain grossness of psychophysical experience. But we aim always to submit our muscle and joint strains, visceral sensations and all that, to the control of our higher, cerebral energies. Now, we may suppose that this subordination of lower under higher centers is furthered and affirmed by the cosmic life, for the excellent reason that in the universal life the lower centers are not *central* and indeed do not exist: all *its* energies are physically, practically ideal. I dare say, the exquisite energizing of the human organism when the cerebral function is uppermost is due to the fact that its energy is then directly in the stream of the cosmic life's cerebral energy. The human brain duplicates in its measure the physical harmonies of the celestial spheres.

2. Now, if the cosmic life is cerebral, it has more in common with the human than either mystic ecstasy or pessimistic coma has yet dreamed of in their philosophies of escape from phenomenal being. There is a dash of insanity in each of these extremes: mania in the one instance and melancholia with terminal coma in the other. The cosmic character, above all, must be well balanced; it must not blink the facts of its experience in an unbroken, maniacal ecstasy, nor must it wear itself out in the currents of being till it seeks relief in the unconscious silence in which its articulate purposes are set.

Just here, I think, we uncover the supreme datum of the cosmic character—its conscious sanity. The cosmic life on its conscious side may well be assaulted by world-weariness. It is indeed in the highest degree probable that the energy-strains of the universal life should become fearfully fatiguing. In such an event the planets would continue on their unbroken course just as our neurons remain in their proper places even while wearing themselves out toward weariness and unconsciousness. Cosmic health and sanity is an

achievement, as we have already remarked. To balance its world-soul between these extremes of endless, senseless ecstasy, on the one hand and endless, vegetative subconsciousness, on the other, I conceive to be the supreme achievement of the cosmic character.

These, then, are the congenital feelings in the cosmic life: strain and haul, now ecstatic and again depressant, but with a practical intelligence that maintains the cosmic sanity.

3. The emotions in particular which characterize this balancing process are in the human case the feelings of *patience* and *hopefulness*. These melioristic feelings lie just between the extremes of world-pain and world-joy. In their pure form they are, we may suppose, non-sensuous, intracortical. Meanwhile, or perhaps just because they are cerebral, they are emotions which simply reek with character. They alone, I fancy, are the emotions which on *second* thought our anthropopathic religion would be willing to transcribe into the cosmic character. On *first* thought we select unbroken *joy* as the pathetic datum of the divine life. But such a gift, as we have seen, cheapens and indeed cancels all the other virtues of conscious life. Accepting it one's life becomes at once supraconscious and impractical. The desideratum of conscious, practical life would be to face eternity hopefully and patiently. And now this enduring patience and hopefulness are literal data of the cosmic character. They are congenital and ineradicable in the well-balanced mind. Sanity is indeed just *practical intelligence*, buoyancy, rebounding energy—in a word patience and hopefulness, the ability to await patiently the returning of life's energies and buoyant confidence in life's outcome. Our postulate of the cosmic sanity involves these emotions as its necessary data.

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COMMON SENSE AND ATTITUDES

IN a recent article in this JOURNAL on "Ineffable Philosophies," Dr. Henry M. Sheffer, with a truly Chestertonian sense for the paradoxical, writes as follows: "To maintain that the last word of philosophy must not be a proposition, but an attitude, a conviction, is to maintain that there can be no last word." And any such philosophies, in which the "last word" is an attitude or conviction, are promptly condemned as being essentially unphilosophical. To do this, of course, presupposes very decided views as to what is and is not philosophy. I agree quite thoroughly with Dr. Sheffer in his conclusion that an element of the inarticulate and

ineffable lurks within all systems of idealism. But in the following paper, leaving unbiased the question as to what is or is not the proper method for philosophy, I have tried to carry out, in a purely critical spirit, the distinction between the "ineffable" and "effable" habits of thought, and have endeavored to show that this distinction is a fundamental one, which may be detected in other departments of human culture, as well as in the history of philosophy.

There are some things which no one doubts. We never dispute about the location of the streets, and if we want the fire to keep overnight we bank it up accordingly. Here we are fairly well agreed, and this I shall call the region of common sense. In this region lie the things that are the same for all. Plutarch, speaking of the first appearance of authentic history, says, "Beyond this there is nothing but prodigies and fictions, the only inhabitants are the poets and inventors of fables; there is no credit, or certainty any further." The thither-land situated on the other side of the region of common sense might be characterized in a similar manner. Beyond the democratic realm in which all men are equal and unanimity reigns supreme, there lies another region in which law and order are lacking and where parity of opinion is not. This I shall call the region of attitudes.

At a certain level of experience all men inhabit about the same world, and no idiosyncrasies are tolerated. This element of commonalty makes cooperation in the ordinary affairs of life possible. Aside, however, from the world which is common to all, every one branches off on a line of experience that is more or less private and unsharable. The essence of this kind of experience is well suggested in Whitman's lines:

> Logic and sermons never convince,
> *The damp of the night drives deeper into my soul.*

People indulge in this esoteric side of life to different degrees. Some have little to do with it, and refuse to venture far from the world of common sense. Others cultivate it more extensively, and such persons develop attitudes. This individual attitude, once attained, is the point of departure from which any artistic, religious, or philosophical enterprise or system emanates, and the standard according to which any such affair, proposed by others, is judged and valued.

I

A proposition in mechanics is good on any occasion and will meet with a uniform reception the world over, while your (?) favorite passage from Walt Whitman may do a variety of things. It may fall completely flat, or bring on a storm of protest. An artist has an

attitude of his own. This is the ineffable something about his work which defies description, and constitutes the charm for those who understand. Happen not to sympathize with this attitude, either by entertaining a different one or by remaining at the level of common sense, and what he is saying will be gibberish and jargon; but fall in with his attitude, and his work is yours by right of pre-established harmony. What is said doesn't count so much as what lies inarticulate under the words. All that your soul has been conserving in its deepest recesses, what was divined but never formulated, has found a socius and something like expression.

This way of viewing art as expression of personality is, of course, only a part of the story. In poetry, for instance, there is to be reckoned with the sonant effect of rhyme, words and rhythm, the decorative element. But in every case, perhaps, the aim to produce something which merely sounds well or looks well is interwoven with a more fundamental motive which impels the artist to indicate his meaning and reveal it to others.

Nothing defeats itself like words, and the last word of expression is that it can not be expressed. When expression has reached a certain magnitude it fades into the ineffable, and casting aside logic and common sense the poet lapses into paradox.

> Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter.

Here in this twilight region where fancy merges into the fantastic, and thought hesitates between sense and nonsense, belong such utterances as, say, Goethe's:

> Was ich besitze, seh' ich wie im Weiten;

and Ibsen's lines:

> What we win is ours never,
> What we lose we gain forever;

and innumerable statements, such as:

> Cold morns are fringed with fire.

However, articulate expression is the artist's business, and to state in plain language that "words fail me" is highly unsatisfactory.

It is, indeed, the "literary" rather than the decorative element of art which involves an attitude. The side of art which has a more direct physiological basis may be depended upon to produce its results pretty much beyond peradventure. Even here, however, the difference between human beings in regard to sensorial equipment is such as to make judgments on these matters fall short of universality. Nor does the element in literature which merely conveys information involve anything attitudinal. It is only when there is a significance to be accepted or rejected, a meaning to be appreciated, that the attitude comes into play.

There are enough facts extant somewhere in the universe, I suppose, to contradict every effect a poet ever produced. Taken all in all, the manifold of fact as the world presents it is a rather indifferent affair. From the dead level of common-sense fact enthusiasm is unjustifiable, and nothing is worth the trouble of mentioning. The poet, however, dispels at a stroke the irrelevant, and out of the chaos spins an effect centering around his personal attitude. He says, *I* celebrate *this*. And you assent, and join in the chorus,—or not. The artist transcends the level of common sense, otherwise he would have nothing worth expressing.

The method of art is the method of life. The question which art asks is, How does it seem to you? That at last is the method we live by and are glad, the frame of mind in which we walk down the street and look into the faces. "Persons are love's world." Not only love's world, but the world of art, and of religion and philosophy, is persons. With science, however, it is different, for the world of science is essentially impersonal.

There is in this vicinity a line of cleavage which divides the whole of mankind into two more or less distinct classes. The same sunset clouds that thrill the poet with subtle meanings and suggestions serve as data for the meteorologist; but by a strange irony of fate these two aspects of the world do not, as a rule, dwell in the same tenement of clay. That part of mankind in whose lives persons and meanings are central have as possibilities art, religion, and philosophy. Those, however, who inhabit a world in which the emphasis is placed on things have open to them, in the main, whatever does not transcend the realm of common sense.

II

The classic warfare which science and religion carry on is a phase of the universal conflict between people who are accustomed to dwelling on opposite sides of the boundary which separates the region of common sense from that of attitudes. Of course, not all church members are actual combatants in the warfare against science. The majority of people neither develop radical attitudes nor clarify their minds on the implications of their life in the world of common sense. But once these two tendencies become pronounced, they are so incompatible that their respective devotees can only regard each other as having no reason for existence whatsoever.

At a low grade of culture man has the notion of cause and effect, but the conception of necessity, of nature as a rigid and ironclad system, is a much rarer possession, and historically a later acquisition. From this conception exact science takes its departure. The French astronomer Laplace, in his famous essay on probabilities,

speaks of a calculator, a hypothetical intelligence, which being properly equipped with formulæ and data should be able to prognosticate the movement of every atom in the universe for all time to come. With the accomplishment of this, science would have solved the riddle of the universe to its own satisfaction. Science means the increasing extension of the province of matter and necessity, and the banishment, as Huxley said, "of what we call spirit and spontaneity." Never to have been overdrawn by the reign of law is to miss the main current of modern thinking.

The importance of science in showing man what in detail the world is, and in giving him a plan for dealing with the things of nature to his own advantage, can scarcely be over-rated. This same knowledge, however, which furnishes the means of living, brings us no enlightenment about the end and goal of life. Concerning such matters, the purpose and meaning of life and the world, men have always been inclined to wonder and speculate; and while science has nothing positive to offer in this direction, it does in general lead to a view of the world which militates against and contradicts that demanded by the "higher" nature of man.

Science and religion in fact are not so much opposed as disparate. They do, indeed, in the case of the individual, tend to crowd each other out; but the real historical opposition is not between two hostile entities, science and religion, but between two groups of minds in which these tendencies have become exclusively embodied.

Hostilities between these two classes of minds are opened when the religionist, intrenched behind an attitude, sets up statements concerning matters of fact. Religion itself is a frame of mind rather than a body of propositions, yet all religions tend to ossify into theology, and thus collide with science. But in the world of time and space the scientist is on his own ground, and the religionist is routed from one statement after another. Then the scientist grows arrogant, solves the riddle of the universe in terms of matter, motion and force, and dismisses the whole religious *Weltanschauung* as illegitimate.

Science postulates necessity in its world, and with that postulate religion has no concern. Where religion is, statements as to particulars are in abeyance, and to be informed that this or that is *impossible* sounds strangely impertinent. Science is suspended. The feeling, indeed, that somehow every day is a miracle might, even to the scientist, be perfectly unobjectionable. It is too diffused and indefinite to challenge contradiction. But once the postulate of necessity is suspended, all discussion concerning matters of fact ceases indeed to be edifying. Whenever there is a *deus ex machina* waiting behind the scenes to be introduced as the exigencies of the

case may dictate, facts are subject to change without notice and inference is stultified. Science is in possession of the facts; while religion guards the rear of "spirit and spontaneity."

III

The conflict which we have been tracing is twofold; not only do the common-sense people oppose the attitudinal spirits,—and this is by far the more fundamental phase of the conflict; but the latter also wage war among themselves. Common sense is one; while attitudes, personalities, ideals of what life and the world ought to be, are many and diverse. In no department of the human mind is this twofold conflict better illustrated than in philosophy. The kind of philosophy which results from giving prominence to the common-sense tendency, which may be classed rather inadequately as "materialistic realism," is, in its main features, pretty much the same whether we find it in Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, Gassendi, Hobbes, or Spencer; while the other sort of philosophy—that growing out of radical attitudes,—which may be classed as "idealistic," and which suggests such names as Plato, Plotinus, Eckhart, Malebranche, Fichte, Hegel, etc., presents numberless varieties *in suo genere,* and countless possibilities.

What distinguishes philosophers of the Herbert Spencer type is, indeed, not so much an attitude as a refusal to deal in that sort of thing. They are objective, impersonal, and scientific; and regard any other way of philosophizing as yielding merely subjective impressions and vagaries of the imagination. We do not feel that there is back of them any unsounded or inarticulate depths; their distinctive feature is simply a habit of mind which excludes, so far as it can, anything savoring of the personal or spiritual. And were they completely successful in this they would cease to be philosophical at all. No philosophy reports facts merely as they come; for the philosopher, like the artist, composes his world; he emphasizes this aspect and subordinates that, in order thus to attain some sort of a unified world-view,—and this act of emphasis and selection is essentially personal. Although, for instance, Spencer's system may seem as if "knocked together out of hemlock boards," it is none the less true that it was Spencer himself who chose to build with boards rather than something else.

The character of any philosophy is determined by two factors,—attitude and technique, or insight and method. With one class of philosophers, as we have seen, the attitude consists in denying all attitudes,; the insight is just that there is no *in*sight. With the majority of philosophers, however, insights have played a large and conspicuous part. This matter of insight is the *pou sto,* the starting-

point which determines the general direction that the philosophy is going to take; while the technique, on the other hand, lies in the linking of the various steps of reflection, in accordance, for the most part, with the so given direction. Technique, method, logical apparatus, is powerless of itself to produce a philosophy; there must be something to give direction, emphasis, selection, impulse, and life.

The conflicts and disputes in the history of philosophy are largely concerning the insights involved; and the peculiar futility of discussion in this region is notorious. A man's attitude takes form, if at all, through a lifelong process, and to reconstruct it suddenly is quite out of the question. The fact that an attitude cannot be taught has been made the basis of many libels against pedagogy, setting forth that wisdom anyhow is incommunicable. Regarding differences of attitude as final, when such matters are in question, we either praise or damn at first sight, and like Emerson can not spend the day in explanation.

In making their ascent into the region of attitudes men carry different amounts of common-sense ballast. Those more heavily freighted appear as utilitarians in ethics, or classicists in art, or materialistic realists in metaphysics. Among those who slip the moorings more completely are the intuitionalists who petition for a "few fancy virtues," the romanticists who long for fantastic thrills, and the idealists who have been known to conclude that being and not-being are the same.

Once fairly launched on the metaphysical sea, for the particular drift which a man's speculations will assume the character of his private attitude is in the main responsible. Says Vernon Lee: "Such an ineffable central mystery exists in the thought of many philosophers; . . . a whirlpool explaining everything, but never itself explained; called as the case may be, 'Higher Law,' 'Truth,' 'Good,' sometimes merely 'Nature,' and, in the remoter Past, most frequently called by the name of 'God.'" There is in the philosopher's mind "something round which his system has grown, but which is far more essential and vital to him than his system: something continually alluded to, constantly immanent, round which he perpetually hovers, into which he frequently plunges: . . . but which remains undefined, a vague It." Imagine the vast *comédie philosophique* which has been enacted upon this planet!—each participant drawing to defend to the death his *philosophia ultima,* when, after all has been said and done, what he took to be final was very largely a matter of taste. The spectacle of men fighting for their attitudes, each in the firm belief that his is the final and inevitable one, is most likely a huge comedy when viewed from the

heights of Olympus; but the fight, let us say, is good,—and as we are assured by Zarathustra "der gute Krieg ist es, der jede Sache heiligt."

In its historical development philosophy resembles art more than science. The sophomore who takes "Philosophy 4" soon learns just what Descartes said and Hume opined; while the student of physics may have heard of Newton, or perhaps not,—Newton himself being a perfectly negligible quantity. A system of philosophy is a personal product, and when the man who made it is through, the system is finished and closed forever, like a poem. Each philosopher starts anew and cuts his system out of the whole cloth of his own life-experience. In this region there is nothing to correspond with the continuous accretive accumulation of science. The scientist takes the work of his predecessors, and after assigning to oblivion whatever is unverifiable, he adds his own contribution to the residue. In the process the personality of the workers is eliminated and dropped by the wayside.

Philosophy has a great show of logic, yet fancy Hegel and Herbert Spencer trying to convince each other: Hegel the devotee to Heraclitus the Obscure, and Spencer the civil engineer. The difference between their philosophies was rooted in the deeper difference of the two lives. The man who habitually centers on facts, things and dimensions will make a realist in metaphysics. On the other hand, the man who views the world as persons and meanings will find his way into the idealistic camp. These two chronic methods of envisaging the world underlie the respective philosophical positions at a point farther down than their logic begins.

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CAUSALITY

FACTS seem to have distanced the growth of our categories. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of causation. It is not too much to maintain that naturalism demands a reinterpretation and deepening of this category that will enable it to account adequately for the development and presence of organic forms and social institutions in the same universe with nebulæ and dark stars. Can a formula for causation be found comprehensive enough to cover these varied conditions? This is undoubtedly one of the crucial questions of contemporary metaphysics. Its solution should give tremendous impetus to the advance of a more plastic naturalism.

Some time ago I sought to indicate a solution of the time problem

with much the same judgment of the situation in mind.[1] I wish now to set forth in outline a view of causality which is in harmony with the position there presented. Since the conception to be developed in the present article has been reached inductively in large measure, and hence as independently as possible of the other field, the fact that the two categories, time and causality, interpenetrate and harmonize in so luminous a way serves as a mutual confirmation. One conspicuous divergence from the usual treatment will be found in the connection of causality with the spatial character of reality. Time and space will be lifted from their separateness and be shown to involve one another. *Causality will, in brief, be proven to mediate space and time in a process view of reality.* The endeavor to establish the intimate union of these three categories will, at any rate, be suggestive.

Causation may be regarded as empirical or as ontological. This distinction corresponds to that between time as a construction within the individual's experience and time as change in the reality-process, and it has its roots in the relation of the individual's experiencing to the world-process of which he is a part.

As is well known, the cause was for a long time identified with the "ground" or sufficient reason. Hume it was who brought into general recognition its temporal and empirical, as against its rationalistic character. Of late years there has been on the part of the absolute idealists a strong tendency to swing back to the earlier position. This is an outgrowth of their aversion to time. As I have defended the reality of time as change, it is evident that I must regard as erroneous the identification of the cause with the reason or the explanation. Exact definition and discrimination must be called in to aid in the avoidance of ambiguity, since the word cause is sometimes used with the signification of reason, *i. e.*, the "why" in the Aristotelian sense.

Strictly speaking, a cause is never repeated. Cosmic history, like human history, is unique. Venn, among others, has well shown this unrepeatable character of a cause when taken in the strict scientific sense, that is, in its complete particularity, and has deduced therefrom its hypothetical character with reference to succeeding events. This is evidently in line with the identification of time with change.

The similarity of causal processes, which forms the basis for generalization and for the practical application of past experience to the present, is dependent on existential repetition, *i. e.*, on the simultaneity or spatial side of reality. Like substances under like conditions give like results. The chemist who has a small quantity of a hard-

[1] This JOURNAL, Vol. V., Nos. 20 and 22.

won substance realizes this acutely. If he uses all in one experiment he can not repeat until he secures his factors again. There are two kinds of uniformities, the temporal and the spatial; and only the first has received adequate emphasis in theory.

Another distinction must be made to prevent confusion. The term cause must be differentiated not only from that of ground, but also from what may be designated the "occasion" or force of detent. A lighted match is the occasion for the explosion of a flask of powder, but is not the cause in the strict scientific sense. As a result of this distinction, the quantitative equivalence of cause and effect as interpreted in terms of energy need not be denied. "Nothing occurs without equivalent transformation of one or more forms of energy into other forms." This is really only the assertion of the principle of the conservation of energy and concerns the temporal aspect of causality. Energy is predominantly a temporal category.

Finally, we must not fail to recollect the arbitrary character of what is selected as *the* cause by popular thought in any causal process. Such selection is the function of some interest. For metaphysics we must hold clearly in mind the fact of a continuous process of change in some system and must not be led into mental quagmires by the inadequacies and confusions of popular terminology.

When time is identified with change the problem of the continuity of cause and effect no longer exists. Causality is immanent. If we so desire, we may call the state of equilibrium the effect. A change in any causal system thrown into the form of time as a construction within the individual's experience with its distinctions of past, present, and future, gives the temporal expression of causality found in both Hume and Kant. With the preceding cautions duly noted, no difficulty need be found in empirical causation which good logic will not solve. Let us, then, regard the uses of the terms cause and effect as a methodological question and concern ourselves with causality.

Upon studying causality more closely by means of the analysis of concrete cases of change, we become aware that past theory was not empirical enough. The examination of the "when," "in what manner," and "for how long," characteristics which differentiate unique causal processes, did not receive adequate recognition. As Ostwald sees, the structure of the interacting factors determines the time variable, *i. e.*, the rate of change, and the end result. Manifold illustration of this fact could be given. The interdependence of structure and function in the organic realm would furnish numerous instances alone. Organization must then be acknowledged as essential to the nature of any causal process.

Now, if organization is a factor in the causal process at present,

it must always have been a factor, or the nature of causality must have abruptly changed at some remote time in the past. There is no reason to assume the discontinuity of a passage from the homogeneous to the heterogenous. Such terms are essentially relative. But the complexity of organization may well have increased in parts of reality. Not only is there no *a priori* reason against such a proposition, but science in its evolutionary outlook is everywhere in its favor. It must be understood, however, that I am not advocating a linear evolution for the universe as a whole. When the universe is regarded as stereometrical and time is identified with change within such a process, what holds for one or more subsystems need not apply to all subsystems at once. Organization is, then, a variant in the universe, but an effective variant which determines immanently its own change.

For some centuries we have been asked to choose between two juxtaposed forms of causality, mechanism and teleology. This has seemed to me a harsh and unreal disjunction resulting from clumsy thinking which did not approach, or even seek to approach, the subtlety of nature. Organization enables us to surmount this antithesis just as in the consideration of time it was shown to mediate between flux and permanence. *The result is the doctrine of grades of causal relation and activity dependent on the organization of the interacting parts of a causal system.* With this view granted, the qualitative at last receives recognition, and the real presence of variety, which evolution demands, is faced. What other agent to account for *directed change* seems thinkable except organization? It has at least three obvious merits: First, that of accounting for the conservation of past activity; secondly, that of furnishing a pivot for development; thirdly, the merit of control. Only when these three aspects are understood in their interrelation can evolution be grasped. A very good example of this method of advance mediated by organization can be taken from psychology. Habits are the precipitate of activity, they furnish the means for the development of new habits and they also control the kind of habits to be formed, at least in part—why only in part is another story which involves the spatial side.

The best approach to the spatial side of causality can be made by a study of what I should call causal systems. An example may be given in lieu of a detailed description. An organism and its environment would together compose a causal system. These systems may be of all grades of complexity and may involve one another in the most intricate fashion. Such a system may be dichotomized and the interaction between the parts so obtained will be seen to be selective or controlled by the "form" of the parts. In lower grades

of causality a dichotomy can not be made with the same ease, or need not even be sought if individualization of some part of the system has not proceeded far enough. Let us take for analysis the reaction of an amœba to a stimulus. Suppose the reaction to be positive. We have immediately a system in process of transformation. No matter what the result, experiment can prove neither loss nor gain of energy. But when we look at this system spatially, we find that the two main objects in interaction, the stimulus and the amœba, play different rôles. The selection appears on the side of the amœba and not on that of the object stimulating the amœba. Selection involves this spatial or simultaneity aspect, not the temporal aspect of the transformation within the system as a whole. Moreover, it must be noted that by spatial I do not mean merely a cross-section view, but a stereometrical view, *i. e.*, the massing of co-existent factors as organized and in relation to one another.

I stated in a previous article that time would be understood completely only after causality had been conquered. The reason for this statement is now apparent. Change has its *Innigkeit* in causality and *directed change* is comprehended only when it is seen that causality controls itself by organization. Quite obviously, it seems to me, our analysis has proven that causality mediates space and time. This is the first time to my knowledge that the intimacy of these categories has been grasped.

The relation between the "occasion" or force of detent and the doctrine of grades of causal activity deserves mention. Selectiveness in man's conquest of nature and in his employment of machines consists largely in his ability to control the occasion. He becomes a factor in a larger system, but his function is to disturb the compensation in definite subsystems. Man thus chooses the "when," the "where," and the "manner." In all this selective activity there is no violation of energetics or of conservation; yet, because of his selectiveness and his employment of machines, man changes the face of nature. The concerted action of numbers of men socially organized carries us to a height of selectiveness which physics is unable to conceive, but which is nevertheless real, for in such activity we are every-day participators. Since we have decided to hold unswervingly to continuity and to naturalism these facts must also be reckoned with.

I will close with a statement of what still remains to be explicated. First, causal systems are only relatively self-determining. The degree of their self-determination depends usually on the grade of their organization. This problem can be worked out only by the sciences. It can be seen that *the principle of continuity needs reinterpretation in the light of this new view of causality.* It will

lead, I think, to a mediation of monism and pluralism. Secondly, man dominates the causal systems into which he enters. This is the meaning of his relative freedom or autonomy. This fact also has bearing on the principle of continuity. Thirdly, grades of causal activity may be simultaneous in a system. A man falls like a stone, but if he sees a rope near he will grasp it, which it is needless to say the stone will not do. Fourthly, the idea of the quantitative and the qualitative requires entire overhauling.

It is evident that I am seeking to attain a stereoscopic view of reality. Of the ideal I have little doubt; my success must be left to the readers for judgment.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series, Vol. VIII. (1907–08). London: Williams and Norgate. 1908. Pp. 268.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for a philosopher to admire a paper whose results are repugnant to him, or to appreciate the weaknesses of one that accords with his sympathies; nevertheless, I shall try in this notice to distinguish good and bad reasoning from welcome and unwelcome theory. Thus Mr. Haldane's paper, "The Methods of Modern Logic and the Conception of Infinity," welcome as must be his repetition of the argument against the "bad" infinite, yet considered as a criticism of the modern logic of infinity seems to me to be an *ignoratio elenchi.* The important question is, how far is the genuine infinite consistent with the definitions of infinity given by pure or exact logic? Professor Taylor, at least, in his criticism of Royce's discussion of infinity, has set a better example than this one, for, though his results are not to me as agreeable as Mr. Haldane's, yet he does take up the infinite of logic and mathematics.

Mr. Latta's paper on "Purpose" seems to me to suffer from lack of a well-defined method. There are at least three possible ways of investigating the meaning of a concept. One may start with a definition (taken from the dictionary, perhaps) and develop, by *a priori* implication, all that can be deduced from that definition. This would be the natural method in mathematics; it may be called the deductive method. Or one may seek a definition inductively, by marking out a certain circle of facts as the denotation of the concept he investigates, and by trying to discover the essential attributes of those facts as the material of the definition. This is the method of the inductive sciences. Or, finally, one may seek the ways in which the term is used by men, and try to patch up one consistent definition out of them all. This means the consulting of dictionaries, text-books, and men. It may be called the linguistic method; it does not directly enlarge our knowledge, but settles questions of termin-

ology. Now each of these is doubtless good in its way, but they should neither be confused nor indiscriminately combined, and Mr. Latta's investigation, I think, does this. For the most part it is the linguistic method. Thus he begins with the definition of Baldwin's Dictionary (p. 17) and modifies it (p. 18) to accord with popular usage, comparing it with the definitions of Taylor and Schiller. Cases are considered, however (pp. 22 and 24), though rather incidentally. Also the popular attribution of purpose to organic beings is used as an argument (p. 25). For the rest, excepting some metaphysical presuppositions, we cordially admire the paper. Certainly a careful examination of this concept is greatly needed, though we could wish a more clear-cut definition than "systematic relation" (p. 27), or "systematic unity" (p. 30).

One of the best papers seems to me that by Mr. G. E. Moore on "Professor James's Pragmatism." He criticizes three points: (1) truth coincides with verification and utility, (2) truth is mutable, and (3) "to an unascertainable extent our truths are man-made products." As to the first point, Mr. Moore finds many truths which are not verified, *e. g.,* that at a certain game a player with a bad memory held a certain card, yet *could* not recollect it—no evidence being possible to anybody (p. 37). This we think is unfair to James, who might (and we think would) hold that if one *called* the idea of his holding that card true, one would *mean* that it was there as terminus of a possible complete investigation. Mr. Moore's realism is evidently conflicting here with the pragmatic idealism. Equally unfair is the criticism of the utility of truth. "Men do sometimes dwell on their faults and blemishes, when it is not useful for them to do so" (p. 44). James, of course, means utility in the following sense: the idea is useful in that when one is in *the environment denoted by the idea,* he is by entertaining the idea enabled better to adapt himself to that environment. And James speaks of the "long run" because, in the long run, one is sooner or later likely to be brought into the environment in question. When a man dwells on his (real) faults without advantage from the dwelling, there is no question of the relation of idea to fact, and no question of truth raised at all, in this connection. These misunderstandings of James are comparable only to the perennial misunderstanding of idealism by realists. However, it does seem that James might have defined the meaning of "utility" a bit more fully, so as explicitly to exclude the misconception about useful lies (p. 47). Mr. Moore candidly enough, indeed, says (p. 49), "I certainly hope he would say that these statements, to which I have objected, are silly," and "if he and other pragmatists would admit even as much as this, I think a good deal would be gained." Since James, for one, has insisted on it already, we do not see what would be gained by repetition. Doubtless, indeed, James spoke carelessly in saying that a belief is true "so long as to believe it is profitable to our lives" (quoted on p. 53).

His second criticism seems to me more just. There are truths that are not mutable. Any idea of a present fact is in a sense eternally true (p. 69). If James means to assert that *some facts change* or that *some sentences are true when they are uttered and later or earlier false,* this is

obvious but trivial (p. 70). "It seems to me impossible that he could speak as he does, if he meant *nothing more* than these two things." "Does he hold that the idea that Julius Cæsar was murdered in the Senate House, though true now, may, at some future time, cease to be true, if it should be more profitable to the lives of future generations to believe that he died in his bed?" . . . "If he does hold that truths like this are *not* mutable, he never tries to tell us to what kind of truths he would limit mutability, nor how they differ from such as this" (p. 70). I am not aware that James has anywhere met this demand for the limits of mutability; the criticism seems to me, therefore, to rest on a perfectly fair interpretation.

The third criticism, of the "man-made" character of truths, is, I think, equally sound. Is this really only a theory of how this or that man came to have this or that belief (p. 71), or only the statement that we entertain our beliefs and thus allow them to exist as mental facts, and so "make" them in a sense (p. 72)? If so, it is obviously true and trivial. But "we should never say that we had made a belief true merely because we had made the belief" (p. 73). Undoubtedly James has been ambiguous on this point, and it is probably these hints of mutability and man-made-ness that have given rise to the misconceptions of his doctrines of utility and verifiability. Mr. Moore has, I think, neatly laid his finger on two sore spots, and one would like to see a definite reply to these two accusations, from James or some other "pragmatist."

Dr. Caldecott's paper, "The Religious Sentiment: an Inductive Inquiry," is small in scope, but clear and logically arranged. It is an empirical study of religious experiences taken from "a small group of thirty-four autobiographies of Wesley's early Methodist Preachers" (p. 78). "These young men . . . were not of ill-balanced nervous systems" (p. 78). "The elementary fear of suffering, the dread of the torments of punishment, is referred to less frequently than might be supposed" (p. 80). Relief from "the misery of self-reproach" is sought at any cost. This seems to be a "central constituent emotion" (p. 82) which "proceeds to draw together the other emotions, and to establish a control over them" (p. 83). Thus, the social sentiments were strong and thoroughly organized, and "in the field which interested them their thinking was vigorous, in some cases notably so" (p. 85), while, on the other hand, "to the attractions of the Fine Arts they were insensible, for the most part" (p. 84). As an essential factor in their religious sentiment "we see a joy unequaled, so far as they can testify, by any other which they knew" (p. 90). Altogether the writer comes to a rather optimistic conclusion, comforting to those who love religion: "that the sentiment included an inner factor which touched the very center of the mental nature; that this central emotion had succeeded in acquiring control over the emotions: . . . and in completely organizing them; and that it was by these means associated with the attainment of an intellectual 'fixed idea,' and with the principal activities of the mind" (p. 93). How can we tell whether the author has proved his point? So much depends on selective emphasis, that one can not be sure, except with great fullness of detail in the evi-

dence. We must know the greater part, if not all, of what is contained in the documents used, in order to judge whether the author has laid his emphases in the right places.

Dr. Hodgson's paper on "The Idea of Totality" opens with ten pages of introduction, which insists on making fundamental and thoroughgoing the distinction of *known* and *existent;* and in accordance with that distinction separating the *concept* of totality from the *percept.* The concept "implies completeness, limitation, and finitude" (p. 105). But there may *be* perpetual data beyond any whole we can conceive: time and space, "as given, are given as exceeding the percepts in which they are co-elements, that is, as given elements which we find, in thinking of them, to be in contrast with the completeness of purely logical concepts, and name, in consequence of that contrast, incomplete, unlimited, and infinite" (pp. 106–7). A realistic metaphysic is partly outlined in the rest of the paper; the paper is, in fact, a short essay in metaphysic, of which the title gives but a faint idea. As such it can scarcely be fittingly discussed in this connection. But I must make one objection: namely, to the definition of "strict idealism" implied in the phrase "its denial that anything which is not-consciousness can be real" (p. 112). Is there any idealist to-day who would be willing to have strict idealism thus characterized? I doubt it.

"Impressions and Ideas: The Problem of Idealism," by H. W. Carr, contains a beautiful illustration of the distinction with which we began this notice, between logically sound reasoning and welcome doctrine. Idealism to Mr. Carr is unwelcome doctrine, though logically sound and irrefutable. "The premises of idealism are undesirable. . . . Idealism pressed to its conclusion involves solipsism" (p. 124), which is incredible and absurd, while yet "I have never met with an attempt to refute solipsism by a direct logical answer" (p. 126). Again: "even a philosopher only gives an intellectual assent [to idealism]; in practical life he thinks as other men" (p. 130). Mr. Carr, therefore, can not logically accept realism and is forced to a sceptical position. Temperamentally this paper is to me delightful, because it reveals so clearly the humor of the issue between idealism and realism. The former is irrefutable, the latter is (apparently) believed by both schools. The humor is none the less, that the situation is much the same as when Berkeley wrote. Mr. Carr is to be congratulated on a frank, clear, and unusually honest statement of the arguments.

Mr. Nunn's paper "On the Concept of Epistemological Levels," is an essay in genetic psychology. The analytical unit of development is conative process (p. 143): mental development consists in increasing richness of content and in systematizing various processes into wholes. So far there is nothing new; but now we read that "the 'stream of consciousness' of the modern psychologist is, strictly speaking, not . . . even one of the data which he must accept and deal with" (p. 148). As an hypothesis "it has become a hindrance rather than an aid to progress" (p. 149). We should postulate instead "the realistic doctrine which takes as ultimate data a psychic monad opposed to a universe of independent objects"

(p. 149). This genetic postulate, comparable in some ways with Professor Baldwin's dualistic standpoint, is interesting as a reaction upon those monistic views (Schiller, Dewey, James and others) of "experience" as the matrix of all distinctions. All this, however, is but getting ready to work: as actual fruit of study we are offered the doctrine of "three characteristic moments in the development of the conative systems which we call the sciences" (p. 156). The first is initiated by intuition of the striking, the beautiful, and the novel (p. 155) (really pre-scientific), the second is knowledge "aiming at practical control over nature" (p. 155), and the third, "the disinterested 'passion' which aims at . . . the theoretical sway of some system of ideas over the province of primary facts which it claims to rule" (p. 156). At all these levels, knowledge has the same general phases, yet in each level is adapted to that stage. This last is no doubt a useful suggestion—though it has been already fully worked out by Baldwin in "Thoughts and Things." "The admission that the precise form and value of the deductive phase must vary with the epistemological level under consideration would, I believe, resolve many apparent contradictions between the views of eminent logicians upon such methods as definition and the syllogism" (p. 158). This insistence on the growth of logical categories is no doubt good, but it must not be strained into the dogma (quite without proof) that the laws of logic are "*merely* [italics mine] the terminal forms of what is essentially a developmental process" (p. 159). Origin and validity, though interdependent, are not identical aspects. Otherwise, Mr. Nunn's paper seems to me a very useful rough survey of the growth of thinking.

Perhaps the best paper is that of G. Dawes Hicks, on "The Relation of Subject and Object from the Point of View of Psychological Development." We have space for but a few points: the paper is as a whole indispensable to the student of cognition. Mr. Hicks first condemns the psychology of cognition apart from philosophy; partly, I think, because he includes under psychology certain problems that many logicians might consider philosophical problems, and partly (must I say?) from lack of psychology. Thus he says, "Considered as mere events . . . states of perceiving, imagining, thinking, desiring, would exhibit no marks by which we could distinguish them" (p. 168). I had thought that perceiving differed from imagining and desiring, for one thing, in the presence of a unique process called belief; again that imagining contains but little, if any, of the feelings of strain which mark the presence of desire, etc. As to "thinking," so vague a term should not be used in such an illustration. Mr. Hicks's main problem is the question: Is the subject-object relation original or derived? And the answer is, for all intents and purposes, "derived," *i. e.*, neither consciousness nor attention is rightly conceived as an inner eye, the objects of which are presentations furnished to the mind" (p. 181). There is, indeed, some relation primitively present, but not this one of subject-object. All we can say is, that consciousness "is from the first an apprehending activity, and is not rightly described in terms of mere 'feeling'" (p. 188). I do not quite see what "apprehending activity" can mean here, as distinguished from feeling, unless it

includes a real (though not at the time known) distinction of subject and object. Mr. Hicks goes on to derive the relation from the "mass of corporeal feeling which . . . may be wholly, and certainly is largely, absent when a content identical in kind is ideally represented in imagination" (pp. 190–1). He has argued this point in a preceding paper (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, I., p. 200) and it is too large a question to be discussed here. Mr. Hicks is here forced to defend a presentative theory of memory: "The so-called 'memory-image' is, then, just as little as the percept a construction made up of psychical material: it is not something that serves as a substitute for the real object" (p. 193). I agree that "too much stress has . . . in this connection, been laid upon "intersubjective intercourse" (p. 195) and "certainly the primitive subject can have no intuitive apprehension of other minds" (pp. 195–6). The author must here put in the customary defense of realism, as the doctrine of a real world existing before we become aware of it (p. 201). As if the idealist denied this! His misapprehension of idealism is shown here: "So far from consciousness starting with an awareness of subjective states and advancing thence to an awareness of what it takes to be objective, there would seem to be stronger grounds psychologically for exactly the opposite contention" (p. 201). He admits, however (pp. 202–3), that this may be unfair to idealism, though he still accuses it of somehow violating common sense. Returning to the subject, we find that on looking back to primitive cognition "we seem to arrive at length at an elementary condition of consciousness in which there would be but obscure and confused awareness of sense-qualities, barely and imperfectly discriminated, and not apprehended as belonging either to an independent world of fact or to the modes of the subject's inner life" (pp. 203–4). There is, however, no generic distinction between such simple apprehension and apprehension mediated by thought (p. 207). "The theory according to which objects apprehended are either wholly or in part mental constructs is devoid of logical justification" (p. 213). Whether or not we like Mr. Hicks's results, we must admit that his treatment is thorough and suggestive.

The symposium on the "Nature of Mental Activity" seems to me not what the author's known abilities would lead us to expect: a rather desultory affair, devoted to much mutual criticism. Professor Alexander distinguishes between mental activity in a wider and a narrower sense, and defends rather obscurely a relational view of consciousness (p. 221 ff.). Dr. Ward criticizes this and Bradley's view, while Professor Read defends idealism—a refreshing change—while Dr. Stout agrees largely with Ward's criticisms.

As a whole the volume maintains the high standard set by the past numbers.

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The "Perceptive Problem" in the Æsthetic Appreciation of Single Colours. EDWARD BULLOUGH. *British Journal of Psychology,* October, 1908, pp. 406–463.

The esthetic judgments and the introspective accounts of thirty-five subjects (32 men and 3 women) upon a series of colored papers are

recorded by the author. There were, in all, thirty-five colors exposed one at a time in a dark room under controlled illumination. The subjects were instructed to give "single judgments," not "preference judgments"; for, the author says: "The method of comparison has been taken over wholesale from purely psychological experiments, where it served special purposes, into esthetic experiments, where it destroys the pre-adaptation of the subject to esthetic experiences, and thereby vitiates his whole mental attitude towards the objects to be offered to his appreciation. It is precisely characteristic of the esthetic appreciation to be non-comparative, individualizing, isolating, and, in a sense, absolute." He tends, therefore, to discredit the results (those of Cohn, for example) which have been obtained by methods involving comparison.

In his analysis of the records Bullough distinguishes four main "aspects" of color. These are: (1) the *objective* aspect, (2) the *physiological,* (3) the *associative,* and (4) the *character* aspect. The objective and the physiological aspects are at first discussed together, and the various qualities which, under these heads, are ascribed to colors are classified and treated under the sub-heads (1) purity, (2) stimulating or soothing power, (3) temperature, (4) strength, (5) purity in the sense of saturation, (6) weight, (7) brightness. Qualities like purity, brightness, and strength are attributed to the color itself and are, hence, "objective"; whereas qualities like warmth, coolness, oppressiveness, seem indicative of an effect upon the organism of the observer, and are called "physiological." The associative aspect emphasizes the suggestive value of colors. The most complex and important feature of color is, the author considers, the character aspect. He says, "By 'character' or 'temperament' of a color I mean the appearance in a color or the expression by a color of what, in the case of a human being, would be called his character, or mood, or temperament; the manifestation of a special, more or less definitely developed personality. . . . The surprising subtlety of distinctions existing between the temperaments of but slightly different colors and the many-sided richness of these characters is such as to cast occasionally some doubt on the genuineness of this aspect in the mind of persons who themselves are insensible to it. Many are, in fact, inclined to consider it as a kind of mystic nonsense, as imaginative romancing or poetic fancy, or as 'reading things into a color.' The criticism is as valuable as that of a deaf person on a musical composition." This character aspect seems at first to be a special case of the associative aspect, but we read: "In the case of associative features—except in those of the most objective type—even the subjects themselves have the latent feeling that it is they, and only they, who impart its meaning to the color. Compared to this exclusively subjective significance of color, the character-aspect exhibits a surprising quasi-objectivity. . . . the temperaments attributed to colors by various and perfectly independent observers agree fundamentally to an astonishing degree, in spite of various most interesting divergences in minor points of richness and elaboration."

The following account of blue and red illustrates the type of description which individual colors receive: "The character of a red or of a

tone tinged with red is usually of a sympathetic, affectionate kind; it appears to come out to you with openness and frankness, while blues are of more reserved, distant, even unaccessible temperament, somewhat like individuals described as 'difficult to know.' This temperament is not by any means repellent; on the contrary, it has an attraction of its own, by the promise of more thoughtfulness and greater depth than red in its expansiveness seems to offer. A similar opposition is to be noticed also in other respects: red is by far the most active color; blue, on the other hand, tends to contemplation and reflexion. Red exhibits degrees of energy which are sometimes almost overwhelming; it was once not inaptly described to me as 'gushing,' whereas in blue there is always some measure of coldness and distant state, which to some persons gives it an almost haughty appearance. While red is impressive by reason of its irresistible strength and power, blue has something monumental in its dignified repose and its peculiar spaciousness."

Corresponding to the four aspects of color the author distinguishes four "perceptive types" among his subjects; of these the physiological and the associative types are most numerous.

KATE GORDON.

WINNEBAGO, WIS.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. March, 1909. *The Problem of Beauty* (pp. 121–146): HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. – The beautiful is not beautiful because it is agreeable; it depends not upon my individual taste, but upon a suprapersonal will to have a harmoniously self-assertng world. The objective satisfaction resulting from the will to have such a perfect self-agreeing world is the only esthetic attitude. Experience presents three spheres: a world of outer objects, a world of other subjects, a world of inner personality. To these correspond, respectively, the visible arts, the literary arts, and music. *The Idealism of Edward Caird* (pp. 147–163): JOHN WATSON. – A sketch of Caird's career, and a characterization of his philosophy. Caird was much influenced by Carlyle, later by Goethe, and, subsequently, most by Green. Caird found in Hegel a principle of reconciliation not before appreciated. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association The Eighth Annual Meeting, Johns Hopkins University, December 29–31, 1908* (pp. 164–190): Abstracts of papers by SCHMIDT, ROUSMANIERE, HAYES, STEELE, EWER, ALBEE, CREIGHTON, MARVIN, SHELDON, DOAN, MONTAGUE, MOORE, HUME, HUSIK, SINGER, COHEN, MECKLIN, FRANKLIN; discussion of realism and idealism by DEWEY, WOODBRIDGE, BAKEWELL, SMITH. *Reviews of Books:* Hugo Münsterberg, *Philosophie der Werte:* A. E. TAYLOR. G. S. Fullerton and others, *Essays in Honor of William James:* H. A. OVERSTREET. W. Dilthey and others, *Systematische Philosophie:* J. A. LEIGHTON. John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, *Ethics:* W. CALDWELL. *Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. Notes.*

Claparède, Ed. *Psychologie de l'Enfant et Pédagogie expérimentale.* Genève: Librairie Kündig. 1909. Pp. viii + 282.

Fifty Years of Darwinism: Modern Aspects of Evolution. Centennial Addresses in honor of Charles Darwin. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1909. Pp. 274. $2.00.

Münsterberg, Hugo. *The Eternal Values.* Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. The Riverside Press: Cambridge. 1909. Pp. xv + 436. $2.50.

Stewart, J. A. *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas.* Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1909. Pp. 206.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE Philosophical Society of Berlin is completing arrangements for the dedication this coming year of a monument to Fichte. This event will crown the centenary of the opening of the University of Berlin, and will celebrate the achievement of Fichte, who was the first Rector of the University and, in great measure, its founder. Professor Gabriel Campbell, of Dartmouth, is the representative in this country of the Philosophical Society of Berlin. Associated with him are Professor Hugo Münsterberg, of Harvard; President G. Stanley Hall, of Clark University; and W. T. Harris, of Washington, ex-Commissioner of Education. These representatives of the Society are receiving and forwarding contributions for the Fichte monument.

IN the review of Miss Shinn's book entitled "The Development of the Senses in the First Three Years of Childhood," which appeared in this JOURNAL (Vol. VI., No. 9), the reviewer noted that the book was not furnished with a table of contents. In justice to the author and to the reviewer, announcement should be made that the table of contents was accidentally omitted by the printers in the first 200 copies of the book.

MR. WALTER B. PITKIN, formerly assistant in philosophy in Columbia University, and during the past two years connected with the editorial staffs of the New York *Tribune* and the New York *Evening Post,* has been appointed lecturer in philosophy in Columbia University for the year 1909–1910, in place of Professor G. S. Fullerton, who will be absent on leave.

DR. BOYD H. BODE, assistant professor in philosophy in the University of Wisconsin, has been appointed professor in philosophy in the University of Illinois.